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Giovanni CAPOCCIA (European University Institute)
Abstract
Notwithstanding the essentially proportional nature of 
the German electoral system, the two-tier system of 
districts, and the complex counting procedure that it 
entails have rendered it liable to some of the
consequences of a well-known form of "electoral abuse”, 
malapportionment. Moreover, the division of the
territory of application for the threshold of exclusion, 
introduced temporarily for the elections of December 
1990, has given rise to other possible forms of
electoral-territorial distortion, labelled here as
"quasi-malapportionment" and "quasi-gerrymandering". 
These factors have had, in some cases, a remarkable 
political impact on German political life.
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ELECTORAL TERRITORIAL ABUSE IN PR SYSTEMS: MALAPPORTIONMENT
AND GERRYMANDERING IN THE GERMAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM.*
INTRODUCTION - ELECTORAL ABUSES AND ELECTORAL SYSTEMS.
Under the label of "electoral abuses" (Taylor and Johnston 
1979) two specific kinds of territorial distortions are 
indicated: gerrymandering and malapportionment. Although they 
are sometimes confused (Hacker 1960; Laqueur 1972), they 
actually refer to different phenomena.
Before discussing the German experience, some definitions 
are in order: firstly, by gerrymandering I mean the 
artificial geographical tailoring of electoral districts, 
aiming to favor —on the basis of the observation of the 
previous geographical distribution of votes— a given party; 
this allows it to exploit in the best possible way, through a 
careful redistribution of districts in the different 
geographical areas according to their prevalent political 
orientation, the votes that it will presumably obtain. By 
malapportionment, secondly, is simply meant the non­
proportionality of the magnitude of a district vis a vis the 
number of its electors. That is, we have malapportionment in 
case of an (excessive) difference between the portion of the 
total seats which is to be assigned on the basis of votes 
cast in that district vis a vis the total number of seats, 
and the portion of population (electors) in that district vis
I wish to thank Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair for 
comments on earlier versions of this paper. The usual 
disclaimer applies.
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Capocc:a-Electoral Abuse in PR Systems
a vis the general population (electorate) (Taylor and 
Johnston 1979).
These phenomena are normally connected with majority 
systems more than with proportional ones, in the sense that 
the effects of gerrymandering are most strongly felt in a 
single-member constituency electoral system, and this 
decreases drastically with the increase in the magnitude of 
electoral districts; malapportionment, on the other hand, can 
always be found, except in a PR system with a single national 
district. This is why the conventional wisdom in the 
literature is that both gerrymandering and malapportionment 
are phenomena normally associated with majority systems, that 
malapportionment alone can be found in PR systems where the 
national territory is divided into districts, and that 
malapportionment is not possible when elections are conducted 
at large or with a nationwide upper tier (Lijphart 1994 and 
1995) .
The analysis of the German case is important for two 
reasons: first, it demonstrates that in a PR system, where 
seats are allocated in a single national district
(constituting the "upper tier" of the German complex 
districting system), there can nevertheless be (and there has 
been) malapportionment; second, that the complex voting 
procedure, which entails a 5% threshold of exclusion, allows 
for another form of territorial electoral abuse to emerge 
when the territory of application of this threshold is 
manipulated, as happened in the 1990 elections.
The article is divided into three parts: after an 
introductory first section, the following two will be devoted 
respectively to why and how malapportionment can have an 
impact in the German representation process, and to the new 
forms of territorial distortion observable in the 1990 
elections.
Before proceeding in the analysis, the question of the 




























































































Capoccia-Electoral Abuse in PR Systems
distortion of representation must be discussed. Since votes 
are actually counted —and seats are distributed— in a single 
national district, the impact of malapportionment in Germany 
is reduced in respect to majority systems. However, there is 
an impact, and this may have important political 
consequences.
Due to the complex mechanism of translating votes into 
seats (to be described in detail in the following section) 
the political impact of territorial electoral distortions in 
the German electoral system is basically given by the 
artificial creation of "excess mandates" (Ueberhangmandate) 
for a party. Such excess mandates (single-member seats that a 
party keeps if the proportionally allocated share of seats is 
inferior to the single-member mandates won in each region) 
were never more than a handful before 1990 (Ritter and 
Niehuss 1991). In the last two federal elections of 1990 and 
1994, however, there were respectively six and sixteen excess 
mandates. In 1990, the excess mandates, all won by the 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU), did not change the 
political situation substantially, since the party had 
obtained a clear victory. In 1994, on the contrary, the 
exceptional result of sixteen excess mandates, of which 
twelve won by the CDU and four by the Social Democrats, 
brought the acceptability of this feature of the electoral 
law1 into debate once more, and at the same time demonstrated 
the potential importance of this feature of the electoral 
system in force.
The political consequences of these excess mandates have 
been, in fact, remarkable indeed: without their twelve 
additional seats, the Christian-Liberal majority, which led 
Germany triumphantly through the complex process of national 
reunification, and is now pushing for the European monetary 
union, would have had only a two-seat majority in the 
Bundestag, which would have made the life of the cabinet much 




























































































Capoccia-Electoral Abuse in PR Systems
the contrary, the same coalition has a majority of ten seats; 
this has without doubt rendered the task of Kohl's government 
less arduous.
Thus, the results of 1994 elections show that, although 
such a situation is exceptional, excess mandates can play an 
important political role. While there may be other causes of 
excess mandates, malapportionment is certainly the most 
significant of them (Jesse 1988; Capoccia 1995 )2.
The focus of this article will be on malapportionment, 
since gerrymandering does not have a similar impact on the 
election results in the German electoral system. The article 
will proceed as follows: after a section devoted to the 
description of the complex mechanism of translation of votes 
into seats used in the German system, the following section 
will deal with the problem of how malapportionment can have 
an impact on the composition of the German Bundestag. 
Historical evidence, with reference to the 1961 elections, 
and to the subsequent intervention of the Federal 
Constitutional Court, will be provided.
The third section will then deal with a "new" form of 
territorial electoral abuse, stemming from the division of 
the territory of application of the 5% threshold in the 1990 
federal elections (the first elections after the national 
reunification). This provision, however much it is justified 
by the exceptional circumstances of the first all-German 
elections, has had strong effects on what can be abstractly 
considered as the "fairness" of representation, based on the 
strict principle "one man, one vote", and must therefore be 





























































































Capoccia-Electoral Abuse in PR Systems
The German Electoral Procedure.
The German elector has two votes at his/her disposal, 
called respectively Erststimme (first vote) and Zweitstimme 
(second vote). The first vote is cast in a single-member 
district. The formula adopted in this district is that of the 
first-past-the-post. The national territory is divided into a 
number of districts amounting to half the total number of 
components of the Federal Assembly (Bundestag). The second 
vote is, on the contrary, a list vote. A list can be 
presented only by a party (a formation which meets the 
criteria defined by the law on political parties), and no 
intraparty preference is possible: the lists in question are 
"blocked", that is, the order in which candidates are elected 
depends on their position on the list. The party lists are 
presented in each Land, each one containing different 
candidates. The law allows a candidate to run in only one 
single-member district and in one single Land. However, the 
share of parliamentary seats to which a party is entitled is 
calculated exclusively on the basis of its share of the 
second votes, and this calculation is carried out in a single 
national district. That is to say, the second votes and the 
single national district are certainly among the most 
important features of the system.
The electoral formula on the basis of which seats are 
distributed is (and has been since 1985) the Hare-Niemeyer 
formula: the number of votes that a party obtains is 
multiplied by the total number of seats to be assigned. The 
result is then divided by the total number of valid votes to 
be considered. The most distinguishing feature of this part 
of the procedure is the threshold of exclusion, fixed at 5% 
of the national vote or to three direct mandates in single­
member districts (from this parties representing national 




























































































Capoccia-Electoral Abuse in PR Systems
denominator of the division which has been described above is 
not the total number of validly expressed votes, but the sum 
of votes of all those parties which obtain more than 5% of 
list votes at the national level. Thus, those parties which 
do not obtain this quota, or which, alternatively, do not win 
at least three mandates in the single-member districts, do 
not take part in the distribution of seats, and therefore 
their votes are discarded in the calculation.
Going back to the Hare-Niemeyer procedure, the "entire" 
unit resulting from the calculation gives the number of 
parliamentary seats to which a party is entitled. Unassigned 
seats are given to those lists which have in turn the highest 
decimal number in their figure. At this stage, the party 
composition of the Bundestag is almost entirely decided. The 
electoral procedure, however, does not stop here. In the 
following steps, dealing mainly with the personal composition 
of the Bundestag, and of which a brief description will 
follow, these results might in fact be corrected by the 
occurrence of some "excess mandates".
Once the number of seats to which each party is entitled 
has been established, this has to be divided between the 
different Landeslisten (translatable as "regional lists") 
that each party has presented in the different regions 
(Laender). In this second phase of the procedure, the 
regional lists of each single party "compete" to obtain a 
share of the total of the seats assigned to the party after 
the first phase of the calculation. The formula, for this 
step of the procedure, is again the Hare-Niemeyer. That is to 
say: to establish how many seats of those assigned to the 
party X at the national level must be given to the candidates 
presented by the party in question on its regional list for 
the region Alpha, the following mathematical operation is 
carried out: the result of the multiplication of the number 
of votes obtained by the regional list Alpha times the number 




























































































Capoccia-Electoral Abuse in PR Systems
is divided by the number of votes that party X has obtained 
over the whole national territory. The entire unit of the 
resulting figure determines the number of seats to which the 
regional list Alpha is entitled, out of the whole amount 
obtained by the party X. Any eventually remaining seats are 
assigned according to the above-described procedure (that is, 
to regional lists with the highest decimal results,in 
succession).
This is the way in which the number of seats to go to each 
regional list of each party is determined. From this number, 
in each region the number of directly elected candidates (in 
the single-member districts) must be detracted. Those who win 
a seat in a single-member district are in any case elected to 
the Parliament. The remaining seats are given, in each 
region, to those on the list, according to their positions. 
If a candidate on a list has already been elected in a 
single-member district, then his/her name is skipped, and the 
candidate placed immediately below him/her on the list is 
elected.
It has happened that several times in the past (and more 
evidently, as has been mentioned, in the last two elections 
held in 1990 and 1994) the subtraction of the direct mandates 
from the number of seats to be assigned to a regional list 
has had a negative result. That is, in a certain region, a 
party X has had more candidates elected in the single-member 
constituencies than seats assigned to its regional list after 
the general calculation. In this case the party in question 
keeps the seats in excess, and the number of Bundestag 





























































































Capoccia-Electoral Abuse in PR Systems
MALAPPORTIONMENT IN THE GERMAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
Districtingin the German Electoral Legislation.
The German electoral system is a PR system, corrected by a 
threshold of exclusion, and the upper tier of its complex 
districting structure is made of a single national 
constituency. In principle, malapportionment should not be 
possible in a proportional system with a single national 
constituency. However, the complex districting system that 
Germany has, and has had since 1949, allows for some forms of 
electoral abuse to take place.
The 1949 federal electoral law established that the two 
tiers of electoral districts were the single-member districts 
and the Laender, numbering 11 at that time. The number of 
seats to be allocated in each region was fixed, and the 
federal law also laid down that each region should create as 
many single-member districts as 6 0% of the total seats to 
which it was entitled. The same law fixed three general 
criteria for the formation of single-member districts: first, 
they had to constitute a "coherent entity"; second, they had 
to respect as far as possible the administrative subdivisions 
within each region; third, they had to include a roughly 
equal number of inhabitants (Art. 20 Federal Electoral Law — 
FEL— 1949, first indent).
The 1953 electoral law contains interesting innovations for 
the aspect in which this article is interested. In 1951 the 
three regions of Baden, Wuerttemberg-Baden, and Wuerrtemberg- 
Hohenzollern had unified to become the region of Baden- 
Wuerttemberg. Therefore, the number of regions (still forming 
the higher tier of districts — the so-called Landesproporz) 
decreased to nine. More importantly, the number of members of 




























































































Capoccia-Electoral Abuse in PR Systems
new law established that the percentage of MPs to be elected 
directly in single-member districts should be equal to 50% of 
the Bundestag (Pollock 1955). This increase was made in order 
not to have to review the boundaries of single-member 
districts, fixed at 242 four years before. Apart from the 
raising of the threshold of exclusion, from 5% in the single 
regions to 5% of the (second) votes at the national level 
(this being the most important innovation of this law, in 
general), and the introduction of the double vote, the 1953 
law must be signalled, in the matter of districting, for the 
fact that it entails an appendix with a description of all 
the districts. Districting is in fact, from this moment 
onwards, brought under the competence of the federal 
administration (Fuesslein 1957; Jesse 1985).
It was with the electoral law of 1956 that the current 
system of counting (Bundesproporz) was introduced. That is, 
the regions no longer had a fixed number of seats, and this 
was established in an intermediate intraparty passage of the 
general counting (see above). The higher tier of districts 
was therefore formed by the entire national territory; 
another innovation of some importance introduced with this 
law was the increase of the "alternative threshold" from one 
to three direct mandates (Füfilein 1957). In 1956, the region 
of Saarland was also returned to Germany, after a period of 
international administration. This region was divided into 
five single-member districts: accordingly, the number of 
single-member districts increased to 247, and the number of 
MPs to 494.
After the intervention of the Federal Constitutional Court 
in 1963 (about which see below), the districts have been 
periodically revised, initially with a law of general 
revision in 1964 . This law also added one single-member 
district, the number of which thus increased to 248 




























































































Capoccia-Electoral Abuse in PR Systems
until national reunification, which will be discussed in the 
last section of the article.
Thegossibility of malapportionment in the German electoral 
legislation.
Article 3 of the present federal electoral law treats the 
rules for districting: this task was allotted to a standing 
"electoral districts committee" (Wahlkreiskommission), 
composed by the president of the National Statistics 
Institute, a judge of the Federal Administrative Court, and 
another five members coming from bureaucratic backgrounds. 
This Committee has, by law, to submit proposals for 
modification of the boundaries of electoral single-member 
districts, in the case of substantial changes of population 
in the districts, to the B u n d e s t a g This is the basic ground 
for the committee proposals, although the law allows it to 
present analogous proposals for "other reasons" too (given by 
the other criteria for districting listed in the same 
article). However, such proposals are not binding, and the 
parliament can change or disregard them.
In formulating its proposals, the Committee must take into 
account some basic criteria, such as the regional boundaries 
(for the logic of the counting itself), and, as much as 
possible, the other lower administrative subdivisions; 
moreover, the Committee should respect the principle 
according to which the number of districts in each Land 
should correspond roughly to the quota of the population of 
the Land in question in respect to the total population. In 
addition to this, the law also establishes the principle that 
"the districts should build an internally coherent entity" 
Finally, the population of each district cannot deviate from 




























































































Capoccia-Electoral Abuse in PR Systems
If the deviation is higher than 33,1/3%, the district must be 
redesigned (FEL art. 3).
Thus, the phenomenon of malapportionment 
(disproportionality seats/population) may occur, in the 
German electoral system, at two levels: first, within each 
region, with districts entailing different amounts of the 
population, and, second, between regions, with the allocation 
to one or more regions of a higher number of single-member 
districts than they would be entitled to on the basis of 
their population. It is exactly this second form of 
malapportionment which in the German system may have effects 
on the composition of the parliament.
An example of how this can happen is given by the situation 
following the 1961 federal elections. In this consultation, 
the CDU had obtained four excess mandates in the region of 
Schleswig-Holstein, since it had won fourteen single-member 
mandates and ten list mandates in that region. This result 
was brought before the Federal Constitutional Court by some 
electors (as allowed by the law), claiming that at least 
three of these seats were due to malapportionment (Frowein 
1974; Luther 1990). This was because the population of 
Schleswig-Holstein had strongly decreased in the preceding 
years, mainly because of the resettlement of those expelled 
from the Eastern ex-German territories (Heimatvertriebene), 
people who had been settled there shortly after the war.
Therefore, in 1961, the population of each district in 
Schleswig-Holstein was lower than the national average. 
Consequently, the region in question entailed a higher number 
of single-member districts than it should on the basis of its 
population, since the number of single-member districts had 
not been revised. This situation led, with a victory of CDU 
in all single-member districts, to a number of list votes for 
the same party which only entitled it to a remarkably lower 





























































































Capoccia-Electoral Abuse in PR Systems
There is no need to comment here on the decision of the 
Constitutional Court (Frowein 1974; Luther 1990); it is 
enough to say that the elections were not annulled, that the 
Court established that excess mandates cannot be created by 
districting distortions (not admissable above the limits 
fixed by the law) , but that they are acceptable only as a 
consequence of the principle of the "personalization" of the 
vote as this is established by the electoral law itself. 
However, the Bundestag (dating from the 1st January 1962, 
already before the pronounciation of the Court) corrected the 
distribution of districts among regions, and assigned only 11 
single-member districts to the Schleswig-Holstein instead of 
14 (Capoccia 1995).
A NEW FORM OF "ELECTORAL ABUSE"? QUASI-MALAPPORTIONMENT AND 
QUASI-GERRYMANDERING IN THE POST-UNIFICATION ELECTIONS 1990.
The electoral^eystem adopted
The electoral system adopted for the first all-German 
elections stemmed from a very complicated process, in which 
different subjects intervened, as we will shortly see. The 
public debate on this matter had oscillated between two 
poles: the opportunity of having electoral rules which were
to be as uniform as possible in all the (new) national 
territory, and, on the other hand, the necessity of taking 
into account, also in terms of electoral regulations, the 
specificity of the Eastern ex-DDR regions (Isensee 1990; 
Brenner 1991).
After a regulatory intervention — which is not important 
here—  about the elections in West Berlin, the first 




























































































Capoccia-Electoral Abuse in PR Systems
law in the Eastern regions was the "Electoral Treaty" 
(Wahlvertrag) between the two Germanies, signed and ratified 
in August 1990. With this document the West German electoral 
law was simply transferred to the ex-DDR, in which the 
Laender had been formally reconstituted (even if they had not 
yet elected their parliaments). The only important exception 
to this— the aim of which was to take into account the 
objective difficulties that Eastern parties would have in 
overcoming the 5% threshold at the national level— was the 
possibility for every Eastern party to connect its second 
votes to those of a Western party, to count them together and 
—having overcome the 5% threshold in this way— to thereby 
manage to win seats in the general distribution. This was 
called "piggyback procedure" (Huckepackverfahren), and was 
declared to be uncostitutional by the Federal Constitutional 
Court in September.
In a famous sentence, issued on the 29th September 1990 (N° 
20), the Federal Constitutional Court declared that the 
procedure adopted would affect the equality of chances 
between parties, since the Eastern parties which did not have 
the possibility of having a strong Western partner would not 
have any chance of overcoming the threshold. The unfair 
treatment of Eastern parties would not be diminished by an 
adoption of a lower threshold (another proposal in the 
debate) for the whole national territory. Therefore, the 
Court established that, for the exceptional circumstances of 
the first all-German elections, the territory of application 
of the electoral threshold of exclusion should be split into 
two regions, each corresponding to one of the two old 
Germanies. To take part in the distribution of seats, a party 
should obtain more than 5% of the second votes in either of 
the two electoral areas. In so doing, it would be entitled to 
participate in the seat distribution with all its votes, 
obtained in both areas. This is the most important rule 




























































































Capoccia-Electoral Abuse in PR Systems
inserted this provision into the modification of the federal 
electoral law. This modification was to be transitory, 
adopted only for the first all-German elections in December 
1990.
The threshold of exclusion and the German electoral system.
The German electoral system entails two (explicit) 
thresholds of exclusion: the 5% of valid second votes and 
three direct mandates in single-member districts. These 
thresholds were introduced in their present form, 
respectively, in 1953 and 1956. Formally, the two thresholds 
are of different "heights", since the so-called alternative 
clause represents, from a merely numerical viewpoint, a lower 
obstacle than the other threshold. This lowering is striking, 
since more than two million votes are necessary to overcome 
the 5% threshold, whereas roughly 1/8 of this amount would be 
enough to obtain representation via the alternative threshold 
(Fuesslein 1956)4. Therefore, parties are treated differently 
by the system according to the territorial dislocation of 
their votes (and also according to the eventual different 
choices of the electors with their two votes). An analogous 
problem will arise in the case of the first all-German 
elections, as will be seen in what follows.
The first all-German elections, as I said before, take 
place under an electoral system in which the 5% threshold of 
exclusion (one of the most characterizing features of the 
system) is applied in two distinct territories, labelled as 
Wahlgebiet West and Wahlgebiet Ost (literally, "Western" and 
"Eastern electoral area"). This has, on the level of the 
formal analysis of electoral systems, some interesting 
consequences.





























































































Capoccia-Electoral Abuse in PR Systems
Table 1 and Table 2 about here
Taking the lead from the level of turnout which effectively 
occurred in this election, if the 5% threshold had been 
applied on the whole national territory, a party would have 
needed 2,322,789 votes to take part in the seat distribution 
(I do not consider here the "alternative threshold", for the 
sake of simplicity). With the "divided" threshold, on the 
contrary, 1,871,305 votes have been necessary in the Western 
area, and 451,483 in the Eastern area.
These were the real "thresholds of representation" of the 
system adopted for the first all-German elections. From a
merely theoretical viewpoint, it is evident that the true 
threshold would be the lower one, namely the Eastern one, 
with 451,483 votes. From a practical point of view, however, 
things are rather different, since we have to distinguish 
between:
1. parties competing in both electoral areas;
2. parties competing only in the Eastern electoral area;
3. parties competing only in the Western electoral area.
The real threshold, then, was the "Eastern" one (451,483 
votes) for the parties under 1. and 2., while the parties
under 3. had to overcome a threshold of 1,871,305 votes.
Before pursuing the analysis further, it has to be 
clarified that the territory of application of a threshold of 
exclusion is not, from a technical viewpoint, to be 
considered as an electoral district. It does not constitute 
the "relative ambit" in which the votes are counted, or the 
"unit of aggregation" for the transformation of votes into 
seats. Incidentally, different territories of application of 
the 5% threshold can coexist with different districting 




























































































Capoccia-Electoral Abuse in PR Systems
In fact, in 1949 the single regions constituted both the 
higher tier of districts and the territory of application of 
the 5% threshold; in 1953, the territory of application
shifted to the nation, while the higher tier remained that of 
the regions; in 1957, finally, both the higher tier of 
districts and the territory of application were given by the 
nation.
Rather, the division of the territory of application of the 
threshold can be seen as an alleviation of the obstacle that 
parties have to overcome, or of a necessary condition that 
they have to meet, to take part in the seat allocation 
process. In this sense, it might be seen as being of a 
similar nature to the provision contained in the electoral 
law on the basis of which parties representing national
minorities are exempted from having to obtain 5% of the 
national vote to take part in the seat allocation procedure. 
In this case, the obstacle is removed, and the criterion for 
this is whether a party represents a national minority; in 
the case with which we are currently dealing, the obstacle is 
reduced, and the criterion for this is the territorial 
dislocation of the parties, their organization and their 
followers. That is to say, the different treatment for the 
different parties also depends on the nature of the 
territorial areas in which they compete, namely, on their 
boundary and on their size.
This also brings to mind the difference between the two 
thresholds of the system, as mentioned before: in that case 
too parties are treated differently according to their 
territorial dislocation. However, the difference between the 
5% and the alternative threshold has been embedded in the 
complex nature of the German electoral system since it was 
invented, and is part of its dual formal structure. In the 
case of the division of the territory of application of the 




























































































Capoccia-Electoral Abuse in PR Systems
different parties occurs within the same part of the system, 
namely, that of the second votes.
Be that as it may, the point is that the different 
tailoring of the territories in which a threshold of 
exclusion is applied can have special consequences on the 
access of certain parties to representation. Such
consequences may occur in every system in which the same 
threshold of exclusion is applied in different territories, 
and are in some ways similar to those which may stem from the 
familiar phenomena of gerrymandering and malapportionment.
I will label the forms of electoral abuse caused by the 
different taloring of the territories of application of a 
threshold of exclusion as “quasi-gerrymandering" and “quasi­
malapportionment". In defining these concepts, I will use 
examples drawn from the German case which constitutes the 
object of this paper, but it is obvious that such phenomena 
may have a generalizable impact, being liable to occur in 
every system in which the same explicit threshold of 
exclusion is applied in different territories.
By "quasi-malapportionment" is meant the inequality between 
the territories of application of a threshold in terms of 
population (or better, of electors). In the case observed, 
there is a huge quasi-malapportionment, since in the Western 
electoral area there were 48,128,370 electors (with 
37,426,103 valid votes in the 1990 elections), while in the 
Eastern electoral area the electors numbered 12,308,190 (with 
9,029,669 valid votes in the 1990 elections). This means that 
there is a proportion of four to one between the two areas. 
Consequently, it can be said that the same amount of votes 
that a given party gains may or may not be sufficient for it 
to obtain representation, following its territorial 
dislocation in one or the other electoral areas.
This was the case, for example, of the Republikaner. This 




























































































Capoccia-Electorai, Abuse in PR Systems
it did not manage to pass the threshold in either of the two. 
In the Western area it obtained 871,773 votes, corresponding 
to 2.41% of the votes expressed in that Wahlgebiet; in the 
Eastern area it obtained 115,496 votes, corresponding to 1.3% 
of the votes expressed there. Let us hypothesize that the 
same party had had the same votes, but in the opposite areas: 
871,773 votes in the Eastern area would have represented 
9.65% of the votes expressed there, and therefore the party 
would have taken part in the seat distribution, obtaining, 
only for these votes, roughly 12-13 mandates. Furthermore, 
the votes also obtained in the other Wahlgebiet would have 
been counted (115,496), providing the party with one or two 
more seats.
A mirror case is provided by the PDS (Partei des 
demokratischen Sozialismus - Party of Democratic Socialism), 
the heir to the former Socialist Unitary (Communist) party of 
the GDR. It obtained 1,003,631 votes in the Eastern area 
(11.1% of the Wahlgebiet), and therefore obtained 17 seats, 
of which one was due to the 109,613 votes that the party 
gained in the Western electoral area, and which were 
"dragged" into the counting procedure by the overcoming of 
the threshold in the Eastern area. It is easy to see how the 
PDS would not have obtained any seats, had it had the same 
amount of votes in the opposite areas.
Had the two territories of application of the threshold 
been equal in terms of population, the phenomenon of "quasi­
gerrymandering" would still have been possible. By "quasi­
gerrymandering" I mean the artificial tailoring of the 
territory of application of the electoral threshold, carried 
out in such a way to favour (or disfavour), on the basis of 
previous electoral results, a given party, consenting (or 
preventing) it from gaining representation through the 
overcoming of the threshold in one of the territories.
Of course, in the case of quasi-gerrymandering we face a 




























































































Capoccia-Electoral Abuse in PR Systems
possible. An example, drawn from the elections with which we 
are dealing, can help us: in the first all-German election, 
two ecologist parties competed separately in the two 
Wahlgebiete (Greens and Greens/Alliance '90). Let us consider 
them as electorally equivalent, in the sense that electors do 
not perceive big differences between them, and would have 
voted for them in either area they competed (This seems 
indeed to have been the case. See Kleinert 1992; Veen and 
Hoffmann 1992; Capoccia 1995). As is evident from table 2, 
the Eastern Green party overcomes the threshold by 94,987 
votes, while the Western Green party fails this objective by 
93,110 votes. In short, simulating a situation in which there 
were no quasi-malapportionment,5 we could hypothesize a 
different tailoring of the boundaries of the territories, 
which, by "moving" 100,000 ecologist votes from one territory 
to another, would have determined the access or the exclusion 
of either party from the parliament.6
In conclusion, if the threshold of exclusion in an 
electoral system is the main instrument of 
distortion/reduction, if the same threshold of exclusion is 
applied in different territories, and if it is enough to 
overcome the threshold only in one of those for parties to 
take part in the process of seat allocation with all their 
votes, the equality of the territories in terms of population 
(the quasi-malapportionment), as well as (to a lesser extent) 
the partisan tailoring of the territories (the quasi­
gerrymandering) , are liable to affect access to 
representation in a way which might be very remarkable. This 
is what happened, for reasons which were certainly justified 





























































































Capocci a-Electoral Abuse in PR Systems
CONCLUSIONS
The article has dealt with the problem of territorial 
electoral abuse in the German electoral system. The system in 
question has a proportional nature, and the main part of the 
process of seat allocation takes place in a single national 
district. However, the complexity of the electoral 
arrangements, and in particular the complex districting of 
the German system, allow for some phenomena of electoral 
territorial abuse to emerge which are normally typical of 
majority systems. Although the impact of such phenomena is 
not normally of great importance for the political system, 
these aspects of the system may have remarkable political 
consequences, as in the case of the 1994 elections.
In Germany, malapportionment can take two forms, which are 
logically and empirically related to each other: differences 
in the voting population between single-member districts, and 
differences in the number of single-member districts in each 
Land in respect to their quota of the total population. If 
these distortions are present, excess mandates can be awarded 
to a party in a given election, and this may, in some 
circumstances, have effects on the general equilibria in the 
Bundestag, as was the case after the last federal elections 
of 1994.
The particular temporary electoral reform adopted for the 
first all-German elections of 1990, finally, gives us an 
example of a new form of electoral abuse, which may stem from 
the artificial tailoring (for whatever reasons) of the 
territorial areas in which a threshold of exclusion is 
applied. These phenomena have been labelled here as quasi­
malapportionment and quasi-gerrymandering, and they can be 
triggered in any electoral system with the characteristics of 
that used in Germany for the 1990 elections. The political 
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determining —especially in the case of 
malapportionment— the inclusion or the exclusion of 
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Tables
Table 1 - Results of the first all-German elections (votes)*
W a h l g e b i e t
tsd.
W e s t
%




F e d e r a l
tsd.
R e p u b l i c
%
I n h a b i t a n t s
E l e c t o r s
6 1 , 9 0 4
4 8 , 1 2 8 77.7
16,4 3 0
1 2 , 3 0 8 74.9
78,3 3 4
6 0 , 4 3 7 77.2
V o t e r s 3 7 , 8 2 9 78.6 9, 1 6 7 74.5 4 6 , 9 9 6 77.8
I n v a l i d 403 1.1 137 1.5 540 1.1
v o t e s
V a l i d  v o t e s 3 7 , 4 2 6 98.9 9, 0 3 0 98.5 4 6 , 4 5 6 98.9
C D U 1 3 , 2 7 8 35.5 3, 7 7 7 41.8 1 7 ,055 36.7
C S U 3,303 8.8 - - 3,303 7.1
S P D 1 3 ,355 35.7 2 , 1 9 0 24.3 1 5 , 5 4 5 33.5
F DP 3, 9 5 6 10.6 1,167 12.9 5.123 11.0
G r e e n s 1,778 4.8 10* 0.1 1,788 3.8
G r e e n s /
A l l i a n c e  '90 1 3 ’ 0.0 546 6.1 559 1.2
P D S 126 0.3 1,004 11.1 1,130 2.4
D S U 3' 0.0 86 1.0 89 0.2
R e p u b l i k a n e r 872 2.3 115 1.3 987 2.1
D i e  G r a u e n 311 0.8 75 0.8 386 0.8
O D P 191 0.5 14 0.2 205 0.4
N P D 123 0.3 22 0.2 146 0.3
O t h e r s 118 0.3 21 0.2 139 0.3
Source: Gerhard A. Ritter and Merith Neuss, Wahlen in
Deutschland 1946-1991. Ein Handbuch, Muenchen, Beck, 1991.
* In the table all parties are inserted which have 
obtained at least 0.3% of votes in one region. The votes 
reported in the table under the heading "Voters" are the valid 
list votes. For further details about the election results, 
see Capoccia 1995, and Ritter and Niehuss 1991.
The Greens (Die Gruenen) have competed in the Wahlgebiet 
Ost only in the territory of East Berlin. In fact, the two 
halves of Berlin had been reunified into a single Land, but 
for the territory of application of the threshold of 
exclusion, the two halves belonged to different territories. 
However, party lists have to be presented at the Land level, 
thus both the ecologist parties competed in the "other" 
electoral territory only in the city of Berlin. The same goes 
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CDU 195 61* 12 268
CSU 51 - - 51
SPD 200 30 9 239
FDP 60 16 3 79
Greens/ 
Alliance'90 . 7 1 8
PDS 1 13 3 17
T o ta l 507 127 28 662
Source: Gerhard A. Ritter and Merith Neuss, Wahlen in
Deutschland 1946-1991. Ein Handbuch, Muenchen, Beck, 1991.
* Since the seats assigned in the region of Berlin cannot 
be calculated separately, here a single column for the whole 
region has been inserted.
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Note about the legal sources:
The texts of the laws quoted in the article can be found in the 
B u n d e s g e s e t z b l a t t  (Official Journal of the Federal Republic of Germany):
- f o r
2 1 -24;
t he f e d e r a l e l e c t o r a l l a w of 1949,, see B . G . B l . 1949,, Vol. I, P-
- f o r
4 7 0 - 4 9 1
t h e f e d e r a l e l e c t o r a l l a w of 1953,, see B. G . B l . 1953,, Vol. I, P-
- f o r
3 8 3 - 4 0 7
th e f e d e r a l e l e c t o r a l l a w of 1956,r see B . G . B l . 1956,, Vol. I, P-
- f o r t h e r e v i s i o n of t h e  e l e c t o r a l law in 1990 a f t e r t he i n t e r v e n t i o n
o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o u r t ,  s e e  B . G . B l .  1990, V o l .  I, p. 2 1 4 1 - 2 4 2 6 .
T h e  l a w  o f  r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  " E l e c t o r a l  T r e a t y "  b y  t h e  (then) W e s t  
G e r m a n  B u n d e s t a g ,  is c o n t e n t e d  in t h e  B u n d e s g e s e t z b l a t t  1990, V o l .  II, p. 
822.
T h e  s e n t e n c e s  o f  t h e  F e d e r a l  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o u r t  of G e r m a n y  a re 
c o l l e c t e d  i n  t h e  p u b l i c a t i o n  " E n t s c h e i d u n g e n  d es
B u n d e s v e r f a s s u n g s g e r i c h t e s  - abbr. B V e r f G E "  ( D e c i s i o n s  of t h e  F e d e r a l  
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o u r t ) ,  e d i t e d  b y  t h e  j u s t i c e s  t h e m s e l v e s .  T h e  q u o t e d  
s e n t e n c e s  c a n  b e  f o u n d  at:
- t h e  s e n t e n c e  o f  1963 o n  e l e c t o r a l  d i s t r i c t i n g  c a n  b e  f o u n d  i n  B V e r f G E ,  
V o l .  16, p. 131 ff.
- t h e  s e n t e n c e  o f  1990 o n  t h e  e l e c t o r a l  r e f o r m  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  
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1 The German Federal Constitutional Court, invested with 
the question, has recently reaffirmed the constitutionality of 
this aspect of the electoral law.
2 As will appear from the description of the electoral 
procedure, there can be other two causes of excess mandates 
besides malapportionment: split voting and the formula used to 
distribute the seats allocated to each party between its 
regional lists. The extent of split voting which would result 
in excess mandates would have to be very big, while normally 
this has been very limited in German electoral history (Jesse 
1988). The d'Hondt formula was adopted to distribute seats 
among the regional lists of parties until 1985. The d'Hondt is 
the least proportional PR formula (Lijphart 1986), and 
therefore in the German context it could favour the regional 
lists of a party in the larger regions, where it obtained more 
votes. Consequently, the lists of the smaller regions (or 
where the party is weak, or where the turnout is remarkably 
lower) would be underrepresented. This underrepresentation 
could mean that, in some cases, proportionally less seats were 
assigned to a regional list of a party in a region in which 
the party in question had more direct mandates. This 
eventuality, which was present before 1985 (in 1961 the 
Constitutional Court was also asked to rule on the 
constitutionality of this aspect of the electoral law), is now 
virtually absent, since the Hare-Niemeyer formula, which 
replaced the d'Hondt one after that date, does not have such a 
strong effect.
3 The other important one is the possibility for the ex- 
DDR parties to form list alliances, something which was 
forbidden in West Germany.
4 The Federal Constitutional Court has very recently 
considered this aspect of the federal electoral law as 
constitutional. Incidentally, the alternative threshold 
allowed in 1994 the PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism, the 
former Communist party of the DDR) to gain representation in 
the Bundestag, without having to overcome the 5% threshold.
5 Actually the quasi-malapportionment has some influence 
also in the case of the two ecologist parties, since the 
Greens/Alliance '90 gets in parliament with only 546,470 
votes, much less than the Republikaner, only territorially 
differently dislocated.
6 Pushing the example further, we might even say that, in 
a situation similar to that of the distribution of votes 
between the two parties like in the first all-German 
elections, an operation of quasi-gerrymandering which had 
"moved" 94.000 ecologist votes from one area to the other, 
would have had the effect of bringing both parties in 
parliament. However, probably no operation of quasi­
gerrymandering could be so precise.
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